RAM 41: AES, Russian Information Operations Target Ivorian Election

Russia-Africa Monitor no. 41, 20-26 October 2025

The Week’s Top Five Links

1. Will Brown, “The bear and the bot farm: Countering Russian hybrid warfare in Africa”, ECFR, 22 October.

2. Charlie Jeffrey, “Africa Corp: Russia’s Intelligence-tied Paramilitary”, Grey Dynamics, 22 October.

3. “russia admits plans to build a network of influence agents in Africa”, Centre for Countering Disinformation, 23 October.

4. “Putin between Goita and Tebboune: Russia’s Balancing Act in the Mali-Algeria Crisis”, Jeune Afrique, 23 October [paywall, in French].

5. David Ehl, “How Russian mercenaries in Mali exploit military equipment”, DW News, 25 October.

Cover photo: screengrab from France 24 (source).

The Week in Analysis

Fuel to the fire. While the country has been a centre of stability and economic growth since the 2010s, the 2025 Côte d’Ivoire presidential vote this week is widely considered a missed opportunity for democracy. The re-election campaign of incumbent Alassane Ouattara has been divisive, with some even labelling it ‘repressive’, as the president seeks a controversial fourth term in office.

Ouattara’s grip on power has been a source of grievance for many. This is the type of environment where disinformation thrives. Indeed, the country has been engulfed in a disinformation storm in recent years. An everyday challenge, this reality now represents a potential destabilisation risk in the context of the 2025 elections.

Like elsewhere in West Africa, a geopolitical dimension is overlaid on this brewing conflict. Namely, many in the region believe the narrative of a supposed French-Russian confrontation over the continent. In this context, many of those who oppose Ouattara cast him as a vassal of France, implicitly or explicitly taking a pro-Russian position in this divide.

This does not mean that Moscow is behind every pro-Russia message. Indeed, some supporters of the main opposition figure — Laurent Gbagbo, in exile — disseminate pro-Russia content through underhanded methods to hurt Ouattara’s legitimacy.

Of course, this is happening as the landscape of pro-Russian disinformation in West Africa is changing. According to research by Bloom, in 2025, once-central figures such as Nathalie Yamb and Kemi Seba have lost their relative visibility as pro-AES (the alliance of Russia-aligned juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) and AES-controlled accounts gain strength.

Indeed, the AES has been identified as a key source of disinformation targeting Côte d’Ivoire. This has been especially the case with the Communications department of the Rapid Response Brigade (BIR-C in French), a force under the command of Ouagadougou. In conflict for many years, AES media has spread the narrative that Ouattara seeks to overthrow the Sahelian group at France’s request.

The role of the AES reflects, in part, Russian influence. It has been reported in the past that Russia’s Wagner Group and now Africa Corps have been engaged in capacity building for the intelligence agencies of its Sahel partners, including Burkina Faso. This training benefited the capacity of the Burkinabe services to wage disinformation campaigns abroad, which Russia-controlled media then amplify.

Beyond the information domain, several Ivorian public figures have been operating from the AES, including writer Sylvain Takoué. The pro-Russian views of this Mali resident are well known, and they include opposing the opening of a Ukrainian embassy in the country, dedicating a 550-page essay to Russia’s Maria Zakharova, and even creating the Putin Peace Prize. (Wow.)

Not all actors come from abroad. Inside Côte d’Ivoire, there is also a coalition of Russia-aligned ‘Panafricanist’ NGOs called the Panafrican Solidarity-Côte d’Ivoire (SOPA-CI in French). Established on 24 February (!) 2024, the coalition features openly pro-Russian forces such as those of the once-Wagner Group collaborator Kémi Séba, as well as Takoué and Pulchérie Gbalet. The social media presence of SOPA-CI has been found to spread disinformation as well as pro-Russian narratives.

Finally, there is Ahoua Don Mello. This supporter of Gbagbo ran as an independent candidate in the 2025 vote, and for years has been an outspoken supporter of Russia. According to some reports, he has even been an advisor to the Kremlin on African affairs. He frequently visits Russia, recently spending an entire month in the country and meeting Russian politicians.

Don Mello in front of a map of occupied Crimea, speaking with Georgiy Muradov (right) (source).

According to some accounts, the logic of Don Mello’s public links to the Kremlin is to gain support for his presidential bid. In his own account, the meeting was about the ‘industrialisation of Africa’.

With all these actors disseminating pro-Russia views, does the Kremlin even need to target Côte d’Ivoire by itself? Well, the intelligence-run media operation African Initiative and the Pravda disinformation network both cover the country, amplifying disinformation and Russian war propaganda. Moreover, several of the individuals mentioned (Don Mello, Takoué) have engaged the local Russian embassy and have been interviewed by Russian state-controlled media RT and Sputnik.

Sylvain Takoué meeting the Russian Ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire in November 2023 (source).

Confusion. Already, several disinformation narratives have been spread by these and other Russia-aligned actors around election time. The Burkina Faso branch of the Pravda network, for example, falsely claimed that foreign troops were present in the country during the vote. The excellent team at Code for Africa did a rundown of the narratives circulating in their excellent article on the subject.

The narratives are, as usual, disparate. But a few Russia-aligned actors have converged on one emerging narrative. On the 24th of October, the website abdijan[.]net released what appeared to be the results of the vote ahead of time. According to the government and the website, the information was published by accident, and the figures shown represented a test of the vote count and not the real result.

Still, several actors profiled above took to social networks to suggest that the publication was in fact a ‘leak’, and that the vote was rigged from the start. The keyword being used is ‘coup d’état civil’. Already before, the narrative of a civilian coup in the October elections was echoed by Russian actors, including African Initiative. The 24 October incident received attention from pro-AES accounts and the Pravda Network.

Samples of the narrative of a ‘leak’ happening on the 24th.

In addition to the accounts, several posts about the supposed ‘coup’ featured hashtags connecting the posts to Gbalet. It is too soon to conclude that this was a coordinated campaign to delegitimise the vote ahead of time. However, the goal of these disinformation narratives points to a similar destination: to create chaos and amplify divisions in the country.

On the edge. As results are set to be announced on Monday, observers remain tense about the possibility of the vote turning into violence. After all, the 2010 civil war was fought in the context of a presidential election. The opposition, however, arrived at the 2025 election divided, so more likely we will witness a continuation of the uncoordinated violent incidents seen so far. In this context, Russian and Russia-aligned disinformation adds fuel to the fire.

For the long term, it is important to highlight that the Ivorian school system and civil society have been active in responding to the disinformation storm. Media literacy courses at school, fact-checking and other measures are in place. As Will Brown writes in his excellent new report (link above), if Europe wishes to make a positive impact, it must support these efforts and let civil society lead the way.

***

Nota bene. Last week’s newsletter on Russian support for the Madagascar coup [RAM no. 40] was the first in RAM’s year-long history to be cited by an established media organisation. In this case, it was an article by Emre Sari and Matteo Maillard for Jeune Afrique about how China, France and Russia jockey for influence in post-coup Madagascar. Merci beaucoup !

Thank you for reading the Russia-Africa Monitor! How did you like this short article? Please leave your thoughts!