Russia-Africa Monitor no. 21, 24-30 March 2025

Russia's shadow over DRC, Sierra Leone, South Sudan...

The Week’s Top Five Links

1. Matt Pearson, “Why are African teams playing football against Russia?”, DW, 24 March.

2. Ahmed Ahmed, “How Haftar’s focus on southern Libya relates to a growing regional strategy”, Chatham House, 24 March.

3. Dani Madrid-Morales, “Responses to a changing media assistance landscape”, DW Akademie, 26 March.

4. Tarek Megerisi, “The bear who came to tea: Russia, Libya and the Kremlin’s playbook for fragile states”, ECFR, 28 March.

5. Mathieu Olivier, “The Information Factory: When Touadéra Denied Knowing Wagner”, Jeune Afrique, 30 March [paywall, in French].

Cover photo: on 22-24 March, a rare example of Russian Islamic diplomacy with the Sahel took place, as a Russian organisation brought to Niger a representative of the Russian muftiate. This was reportedly the first such visit from Russian Muslim authorities to Niger (source).

The Week in Analysis

DRC statement. As documented in several editions of RAM, Russia has aimed to gain a slice of the security market of the Democratic Republic of Congo, at least since 2022. However, not wishing to alienate its Western partners, Kinshasa has opted for European (Bulgaria and Romania-based) private military companies (PMCs), namely, Congo Protection and Agemira. Clearly, this has left a chip on the shoulder of the Russians. This week, deputy Russian Ambassador to the UN, Anna Evstigneeva, made a statement at the Security Council on the eastern DRC crisis, where she criticised MONUSCO’s ‘welcoming’ attitude to European PMCs in the country. Of course, the hypocrisy is rampant, considering the role of Russian armed forces across the continent and their attempts at swaying Kinshasa to take up the Wagner Group. So, Evstigneeva’s comment can be interpreted as a jab at Kinshasa, couched in criticism at the UN mission in the country. While this was a single sentence in her 6-minute speech, Russian disinformation channels picked it up and amplified the line.

There was more to Evstigneeva’s comments, however. This week was marked by Angola’s decision to withdraw from the role of mediator in the eastern DRC crisis. Running for over two years, the Luanda process was a hopeful initiative, but it collapsed when no agreement was found about the involvement of the M23. Indeed, Rwandan President Paul Kagame has insisted on involving the M23 directly in the process, which Kinshasa treats as a red line, with President Tshisekedi stating in January ‘[a] dialogue with a terrorist group like the M23 is a red line that we will never cross’. Here, Russia has been aligned with the Luanda process, a position it shares with the US and Ukraine. In her speech, Evstigneeva mentioned that without the ‘regularisation’ of the ‘status’ of M23, a political solution for the conflict ‘cannot be found’. This enigmatic statement runs counter to the DRC red line, but Moscow is not alone in calling for Kinshasa to open a dialogue with M23.

Sierra Leone comes into focus. Despite having no embassy in Freetown, Moscow continues its discreet engagements with Sierra Leone. Indeed, on 29 March, Russian state media published several articles with quotes Mohamed Yongawo, Sierra Leone’s ambassador to Russia, on a range of subjects. Crucially, Yongawo stated that Russian state-owned companies Zarubezhgeologiya and RUSAL are actively exploring or planning to explore for mineral deposits in Sierra Leone.

RUSAL, in particular, is interesting to see active in this space, as the company has a large bauxite processing operation in neighbouring Guinea. In fact, RUSAL is a key player in supporting Moscow’s engagements with Guinea and played a role in assisting Alpha Condé’s attempts at state capture during his tenure (2010-2021). Russian disinformation and propaganda channels picked up several quotes of Yongawo, particularly concerning the potential cooperation in mining, portraying it as a done deal. The current government in Sierra Leone features several top-level officials with a Russia-leaning streak, who have been lobbying for greater contacts with Moscow. As readers of RAM are aware, Russia already operates a branch of the Russia House in Sierra Leone. Of course, things are not as simple. Russia promised Sierra Leone that its Freetown embassy would open… in 2024.

In 2022, the neo-nazi Russian PMC Rusich published on its official Telegram channel photos allegedly of its leadership on a ‘business trip’ in Sierra Leone.

Russia-Mali business forum. On 25 March in Moscow, African Initiative organised a business event for Russian and Malian counterparts. The event was reportedly organised with the support of the Russian Chamber of Commerce, an organisation close to the Kremlin. Members of the Russian Duma were in attendance, including Dmitry Kuznetsov. Reportedly, during the event, the Malian consul stated that Russia is Mali’s partner of choice for the future economic development of the country. Technological transfers, higher education, agriculture, energy and logistics were especially the focus of attention. Curiously enough, this seemingly benign cooperation agenda was described Fousseynou Ouattara, Vice-Chairman of the Defence Commission of the Malian parliament.

Russia-Mali business forum in Moscow, 25 March. Photo: Salia N’golo Keita.

Despite being a key partner to the Malian junta, Russia indeed does not trade much with the country. Interestingly, African Initiative quoted one of the participants saying that Malians often have to discuss economic cooperation with Russia through bureaucrats and not businesspeople. This echoes something readers of RAM are aware of, which is the large extent trade between Russia and Africa runs through state companies. So, one of the initiatives mentioned in the event was the need to establish a Russia-Mali business council to facilitate bilateral trade.

Detail: on 24 March, a military cooperation agreement signed in 2003 by Mali and Russia came into effect.

New Russian Ambassador to Eritrea. Oleg Petrenko was named as the new Russian Ambassador to Eritrea. His predecessor, Igor Mozgo served in the country between 2021 and 2025. Mozgo is a veteran diplomat who served in Yugoslavia and Ghana, and previously in Eritrea, too (2006-2008). Petrenko apparently was an advisor to the Russian embassy in Guinea, another important posting for Russian diplomats in Africa. The timing of the change is intriguing, as tensions between Asmara and Addis Ababa reach the boiling point and Russia continues its cooperation with (new) BRICS member Ethiopia.

More Congo encounters. On 24 March, Russia’s representative to Africa and the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov, met with Françoise Joly, strategic cooperation representative of the Republic of Congo. Joly is a close associate of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the long-serving president of the country. She is also a frequent interlocutor with the Russians, with whom she has developed positive relations, especially with the MFA. The topic of discussion is vaguely described as following up on the Sassou Nguesso visit to Russia in 2024.

Joly meeting Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov in January 2023 (source: RU MFA).

During that visit, the agenda of Sassou Nguesso mostly focused on energy projects. Republic of Congo is a major oil producer and entertains relations with most companies, including Russian ones. In September 2024, it was revealed that Moscow is cooperating with Brazzaville in the construction of several energy infrastructure projects, including an oil pipeline deal, criticised by members of the Congolese opposition as detrimental to the country. Joly is a perfect intermediary to discuss the subject as, according to Africa Intelligence, she has been among the facilitators of Congo’s relations with oil producers and traders. With this background, it cannot be discarded that the topic of her meeting with Bogdanov addressed oil. Another potential topic is Libya. Indeed, Sassou Nguesso was appointed the African Union envoy to the political negotiations there, as the continental bloc pushes for Africa not to be sidelined from the political process there. With Russia remaining a player in Libya, the Congo connection remains relevant.

South Sudan tensions. The arrest of Vice-President Riek Machar on 26 March raised concerns that a new civil war might break out in the country. Indeed, since February did tensions between the forces of President Salva Kiir and those controlled by Machar have led to deadly clashes in Upper Nile state. Russian media channels have been covering the event matter-of-fact, and Moscow is quiet about the fighting. What would Moscow do were Kiir to reach out for support? Indeed, since 2023, there has been a rapprochement between Juba and Moscow, with several South Sudanese government ministers traveling to Moscow in recent years, as well as a Russian embassy announced. According to reports, state-owned company Rosoboroneksport covertly exported weapons to figures in the South Sudan military ‘at least’ since 2019.

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