Ukraine-Sudan Issue Binding: a US Trump Card?
A report by Jeune Afrique hints at the possibility of the White House leveraging Sudan for concessions on Ukraine.
Here is an one-off comment, too long for the Russia-Africa Monitor. Enjoy!
Could a US Russia-Ukraine deal involve Sudan? Mathieu Olivier of Jeune Afrique came back this week with an intriguing report about Chad’s diplomatic front in the Sudan civil war (behind paywall). The report includes some speculation concerning the Russo-Ukranian war.
Anonymous sources quoted by Olivier claim that the US has mostly left Iran and Russia to operate openly in Sudan as a way to gain leverage on other issues, including Ukraine and Gaza. When it comes to Russia, the underlying logic is that allowing Moscow to gain scope in Sudan could act as a bargaining chip to get Moscow to comply in Ukraine-related issues.
Binding Ukraine to Sudan would be an intriguing development. It is possible that the sources consulted by the JA report were eager to paint the passivity of the Biden White House regarding Sudan as a strategic move. Yet, despite being rather passive in Sudan, the US has leverage.
Russia is well known to seek a Red Sea base for many years, with active attempts happening for over a decade. During the 2010s, Russian diplomacy knocked on the doors of several countries, including Eritrea and Yemen, both countries where the Soviet Union had naval installations at different points.
The US opposed these moves. Reportedly, in 2014, US diplomacy mobilised to pre-empt a Russian move in Djibouti, a country already hosting the only US full-scale base in Africa. (China opened its own African base in Djibouti later, in 2017.) Eventually, Russia made a deal with Sudan’s Omar el-Beshir in 2017, at a time when US-Sudan relations were at a low point. To this day, Sudan remains the likeliest place for Moscow to fulfil its Red Sea ambitions.
The US has other leverage available. According to the sources consulted by Olivier, Hemetti has made overtures to Washington, to establish a partnership that would help the RSF fight the war. These moves have gone nowhere, with the UAE and Chad being Hemetti’s two sole sources of support. (The UAE is the main backer while Chad has operated as a strategic rearguard.)
Would Moscow even contemplate a US offer to lift its red line on Red Sea basing in exchange of concessions in Europe? The Sudanese civil war makes any large infrastructure development (such as a naval base) a far-off possibility. Moreover, the Syrian rebels have hinted at Moscow being able to keep its base in Tartous as a way to prevent the Kremlin to step in to defend Assad.
Despite the distance, the Russo-Ukranian war and the Sudanese civil wars have intersected in the past. In late 2023 and early 2024, Ukrainian special forces operated on Sudanese soil against the Wagner group, at the time working with the rebelling RSF. Indeed, at the start of the civil war, Wagner was a close partner of the RSF rebels, led by Mohamed ‘Hemetti’ Dagalo. Reportedly, the Ukrainian forces operated in exchange for Sudan to provide ammunition to Ukraine or even to act as a conduit for third countries to transfer arms to Ukraine. This element of the deal is unclear, but the Ukrainian operations in Sudan have been confirmed by Kyiv Post and The Wall Street Journal.
In recent months, however, Russian diplomacy shifted from supporting the RSF through Wagner to supporting Ukraine's circumstantial Sudanese ally. Reports from Kyiv have interpreted this change as a move to neutralise the Ukrainian-Sudanese partnership. Prigozhin’s death is also likely a factor. In addition, the Sudanese government of al-Burhan has faced increased losses, making future outwards arms transfers impossible and thus reducing the value of the partnership for Kyiv.
The Ukrainian operations in Sudan show that the two wars can be bound together, despite their distance and differences. Will they become bound again in 2025?